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Abstract 
This study work was based on the idea of “consumption smoothing theory” which was 
demonstrated based on “life-cycle model of consumption” and the main aim of the study was, 
analyzing the effect of informal credit on household welfare. Following two stage least square 
regression analysis by taking average number of informal borrowing participant households 
within community as an instrumental variable for informal credit in order to avoid endogeneity, 
the study found that informal credit and households welfare have positive relationship. Each 
thousand Birr 1  received in the form of informal credit improves welfare expenditure of 
household by about 4.3 percentage, ceteris paribus. This result was consistent with pervious 
works of (Kati.S, 2010; Cuong.V.N & Marrit.vanden.B, 2011).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
1 Birr is the name of Ethiopian currency. 
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1. Introduction 
Rural households are more venerable for various socio-economic as well as recently for 
environmental related factors. Specially, because of nature-based agricultural livelihood system, 
in rural section of developing economies, the issue has becoming more exacerbated. Due to this 
income is volatile and consumption is not smoothed (Anne.C, 1995). To escape from these, the 
rural households looks for alternatives of selling durable assets, having informal credits, 
“liquidation of previous savings”, participating on rotating savings and credit associations, and or 
social security networks; which together named as nonmarket institution by Timothy Besley 
(Timothy.B, 1995). These are means to resist shock so that consumption is smoothed and 
livelihood sustained through bad periods (Anne.C, 1995).     
 
Though, rural households have options to survive in bad periods, but from their economic 
background of subsistence, non-ownership of easily liquidable assets and inaccessibility of 
savings and formal credit access (Yann.B & Rachel.K, 2007; Anne.C, 1995; Jonathan.B, 
Cristobal.M, Laura.S, Jeanette.T, & Anna.Y, 2011) forces them inclined to more to informal 
means of risk sharing mechanisms (Diagne.A, Zeller.M, & Sharma.M, 2000). The mechanism 
has been serving as a way in which rural households have get credit, insurance or in general risk 
sharing to survive in situation of bad circumstances based on their personal relationship of 
relativeness, neighborhood, social networks, etc,.  
 
Thus, this study focuses on credit related informal risk sharing mechanism, in which rural 
households obtain credit in informal way from relatives, neighborhood, religious institutions, 
friends, shops, groceries, etc,. the form of risk sharing most famous in rural part of developing 
countries (Stefan.D, 2002). The rationales to undertake this study were: first, the country’s 
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current status; Ethiopia is among low income countries with 79 percent of the population live in 
rural area (WB, 2018). Thus, knowing the various characteristics of rural household can will lead 
to better direction for formulation and implementation of plausible policies. Second, limited 
study in the area; although there are studies by (Alemayehu.G, Abebe.S, & Daniel.Z, 2006; 
Abbi.M.K & Gamal.I, 2011; Bocher.T.F, Alemu.B.A, & Kelbor.Z.G, 2017; Gurmessa.N.E & 
Catherine.N, 2017; Yehuala, S. , 2008), these studies are focused on access to credit rather than 
amount of credit obtained. In addition to these, most of the studies are limited to regional specific 
and doesn’t represent recent phenomena.      
 
In connection to this, the study was undertaken with aim of analyzing the impact of informal 
credit on rural household welfare. Specifically, to identify factors that determine welfare of rural 
households; to see how informal credit, farm and nonfarm income as well as assistance, 
extension program participation and household size affects the welfare of rural household and to 
suggest supportive policy direction that can improve welfare of the rural household.  
 
To this end, following two stage least square regression analysis (2SLS) by taking average 
number of informal borrowing participant households within community as an instrumental 
variable for informal credit in order to avoid endogeneity, the study found that informal credit 
and households welfare have positive and statistically significant relation.   
 
For convenience purpose, the paper was structured in six sections including the introductory part. 
The second part presents literature review, the third part is about data and methodology, the 
following section is about descriptive statistics, result presentation and discussion, the fifth part 
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will look-over robustness check of the result, and the final part will present conclusion and 
policy recommendations.  
2. Literature Review  
 
2.1 Informal credit and Household Welfare Theoretical Foundation   
 
This study work was based on the idea of consumption smoothing theory which was 
demonstrated based on “life-cycle model of consumption”. The model describes about the whole 
life time movement of individual/household based on consumption and saving choices 
(Mankiw.N.G, 2010). These choices matter in current as well as future individual or household 
or whole economy movement. More consumption today determines future consumption and 
more saving today has implication on future consumption. Since, the focus of the study was 
about household welfare and credit, the life-cycle model of consumption has important 
implication on the study through theory of consumption smoothing.  
 
The economic idea of consumption smoothing become popular after the life-cycle model of 
Modigliani and Brumberg. It reflects, how households try to maintain smoothed consumption 
through time with fluctuation in income. Smoothing consumption through time is possible by 
action of such as borrowing, past saving, depleting assets, adjusting employment situation, and 
others (Jonathan.M, 1995). Based on this theoretical foundation, the study tries to show how 
informal credit can affect households’ welfare by smoothing their consumption expenditure.   
 
2.2 Why Informal Credit? 
 
Before looking at the above question, it is important to know who are participating in informal 
credit sector both form supply and demand side. From demand perspective, there are three 
4 
 
groups are participants in rural informal credit. Manfred named them 1. “vulnerable households 
near or below poverty line”; 2. “above the poverty line and not vulnerable” and 3. “larger 
agribusiness and other firms and owners of plantations”. The classification was based on the 
individual or household income level and or economy activity. Individuals whose activities are 
daily laborer, tenant, smallholder agriculturalist, small land owners for food production are 
considered as client of first group. The second group consistence of civil servants and owners of 
above average land size and micro and small enterprises, etc. Under the third category, 
individuals who have capacity to use formal financial sectors but due to less accessibility fall to 
use them are included (Manfred.Z, 2003).  
 
From supply side, Barbara and Srinivas, divided informal credit suppliers in to three categories. 
The "transactional credit suppliers": those are making lending activities regularly and for 
whom credit is a business transaction. Under this category we have money lenders, traders, 
employers etc. The "mutual credit suppliers": credit supply based on ideology of give and take. 
Here they listed ROSCAs, credit unions, credit societies, people's organizations/self-help groups 
as an example. The "personal/casual credit suppliers": this category includes peoples who give 
loans in a casual manner which is consider as a favor given to friends, relatives, coworkers and 
neighbors (Barbara.I & Srinivas.H, 1996).  
 
From economics perspective, if there are supply and demand, market will be created and 
transaction will occur and the same is true for informal credit market. But, why informal credit? 
Both formal as well as informal credit coexist together in most situation because of their own 
trade-off. But, in third world, where formal financial institutions are at low stage of development 
and not easily accessible, informal financial institutions are dominate one. Especially, the rural 
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part of developing economies are over attached with informal financing for major socio-
economic activities (Abhijit.V.B & Esther.D, 2006; Barslund.M & Finn.T, 2008). 
In this regard, the question of, what makes the informal credit superior? has been area of interest 
for many studies and scholars and they come-up with the following justifications: First, the issue 
of size of project forces the borrowers to make choose between formal and informal credit. The 
smaller the project with low capital requirement and the more likely the project owner going to 
finance from informal credit sources (Alexander.K & Anke.K, 2017). Second, social capital. The 
social bond created within societies and trust developed between individuals, friends and 
relatives also directs borrowers to informal credit market; because, it lowers “interest rate than 
formal loans”; which provides large borrowing opportunity with low price for poor and asset 
disadvantaged groups (Haileleul.G, 2001; Alexander.K & Anke.K, 2017).    
 
Third, low monitoring and enforcement cost; lender as well as borrower are known well each 
other in informal credit. Since, most of the time, the landing-borrowing activities are taken place 
among households, friends, relatives or individuals within same village and which provides 
participants to have better information among and create easy way to monitor and requires low 
cost to enforce during default (Stiglitz.J, 1990; Bond.P & Robert.T, 1997). It has also low 
transaction cost than formal credit (Liqiong.L & etal., 2019; Agegnehu.B, Karantininis.K, Li.F, 
2012). Fourth, economic background of the borrower; study by Abhijit and Esther (Abhijit.V.B 
& Esther.D, 2006), on thirteen poor countries identified, households and individual who are in 
extreme poverty, because of low access of formal institutions for financial services, mostly 
depends on informal sources for financial need (Abhijit.V.B & Esther.D, 2006).  
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Fifth for consumption smoothening; due to limited window form formal lending institutions2 for 
consumption smoothening, households prefer informal money lender as a means to escape from 
financial shortage and coping with shock. After all it is sustainable consumption that matter more 
for rural poor households. Thus, in order to achieve sustainable consumption to keep better 
welfare, the marginalized low-income households opt for informal credit that smooth their 
consumption pattern (Barslund.M & Finn.T, 2008; Kati.S, 2010).  
 
The other possible reason for informal credit is zero or less collateral and non-profit motive. 
Collateral serve as an instrument to be protected from information asymmetries between 
borrowers and lenders, that will cause adverse selection and moral hazard. But, in the case of 
informal credit, collateral is less important compared to formal credit (Carmen.K, Lukas.M, 
Doris.N, 2013; Alexander.K & Anke.K, 2017). Also, the credit activities are mostly based on 
helping each other which is grounded on “solidarity and mutuality of action” rather than profit 
motive (Srinivas.H, 2016). Inexpensiveness or short procedure of informal credit and freedom of 
credit allocation are also other factors behind rural informal credit (Agegnehu.B, Karantininis.K, 
Li.F, 2012).    
 
Some also choose informal credit because of its characteristic of multiple proprietorships and 
personalized services. Informal credits formed by group are characterized by proprietorship in 
which the group members are liable and which provide the members multiple proprietorship 
opportunity to secure from default. In relation to personalized services, formal institutions 
“operates with structure and procedures which are common to all borrowers”. But in case of 
                                                            
2 “Formal sector focuses almost entirely on production loans and asset accumulation” (Barslund and Tarp 
2008). 
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informal credit sector, there are options to rearranges and modify the operating means based on 
the requirements of the creditor (Srinivas.H, 2016). In general, “poor are often excluded from 
formal credit markets” but, because of easy means of access, less collateral, better information 
fellow within borrower and lender makes informal credit preferred over formal credit special by 
poor section (Yan.Y & Lihe.X, 2015). 
 
2.3 Previous Studies  
 
For many of financial analysts and in financial market study, households are considered as savers. 
Finance related course of studies and research areas considered government and firms as fund 
users and households as savers or fund providers (Anthony.S & Marcia.M.C, 2012). But, 
household also make credit from formal as well as informal financial institutional setups and for 
that matter the theory of consumption smoothing was based on credit. For households with 
problem of temporary finance, it is credit that improves well‐being (Christine.L.D, 2018). Even 
though, the number of participant households in fund provision are higher than that of fund user, 
in financial markets such as primary mortgage markets (single-family home loans), households’ 
participation in use of credit has been increasing (Peter.S.R & Richard.L.H.Jr, 2000). Thus, 
households are both producers and consumers of fund in financial market through saving and 
borrowing.   
 
There are different views about household welfare outcome of credit. While saving provides 
security for future welfare, credit is means for escaping from current financial shortage for 
households which will be used for welfare maintenance or improvement. Both from provider as 
well as receiver perspective, welfare will be affected with credit. The provider’s welfare affected 
in terms of saving for future consumption with scarification of current consumption and the 
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receivers’ welfare is affected in revers way, through solving the current financial problem at cost 
of future free or interest-bearing repayment.  
Even though, many studies identified positive household welfare outcome of credit, still there are 
studies which showed negative outcome of credit on household welfare. From negative side, the 
study undertaken by (Britta.A & etal., 2015), identified that credit will reduce the consumption 
of household. In the study, they come-up with reduction of durable and non-durable household 
consumptions by amount of 15 percent for treatment group than control group. 
 
Cuong.V.N and Marrit.vanden.B (2011) while studying the impact of informal credit on poverty 
and inequality, they found positive impact of credit on poverty reduction. The study showed poor 
gets better proportion of credit from informal than formal institutions and credit reduces “poverty 
incidence of borrowers by 8 percentage points”. As poverty much attached with consumption 
and welfare, reduction of poverty is much attached with increase in consumption level and 
improvement of welfare. Study by Bruno, Florencia, Esther and William, estimated the effect of 
microcredit on household consumption expenditure and resulted in negative and insignificant 
effect of credit on consumption (Bruno.C, Florencia.D, Esther.D, & William.P, 2015).   
 
Still study based on randomized control trial by (Abhijit.V.B, Esther.D, Rachel.G, 2015); 
microcredit effect on various socio-economy outputs, resulted on controversial outcomes on 
durable and nondurable goods expenditure. The study found that credit doesn’t “significantly 
improves consumption”. Both for treatment and comparison group households, the overall result 
of credit impact on expenditure of both form of goods was insignificant (Abhijit.V.B & 
Sendhil.M, 2010). Study on private transfers, informal loans and risk sharing among poor urban 
households in Ethiopia, identified how credit helps households to escape from “low and 
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uncertain incomes” and there by smoothing the overall consumption pattern (Eskander.A & 
Selfe.D, 2009).     
 
Credit also improves household welfare by improving consumption and housing type both in 
short as well as long run (Guush.B & Cornelis.G, 2011). The study based on fixed and random 
effect model identified that credit has significant effect on “per-capita household consumption”.  
 
Study by Salia, found how credit contributes to reduction of poverty and improvement of 
household welfare by providing opportunity to “acquire more and long-term asset”; that will be 
used to finance education and medical expense of the household (Salia.P.J, 2014). Food related 
poverty which has been problem in many developing countries are majorly due to weak asset 
base of household and which can be resolved mostly by credit. Sivchou.T and etal. (2011) 
realized this situation while studying Prek Norin Commune in Cambodia. Credit improves 
standard of living through creating job opportunity that facilitate the increment of income and 
asset.        
 
According to Langat, Mutai, Maina and Bett, “credit and household welfare has positive 
relationship”. Household who participate in credit market has better welfare outcome than 
household who can’t (Langat.J.K, Mutai.B.K, Maina.M.C, & Bett.H.K, 2011). That is, 
households with more credit amount has better welfare than household with less amount of credit 
(Agegnehu.B, Karantininis.K, Li.F, 2012). Credit also “increases the households’ economic 
welfare” through improving per-capita income, expanding food and non-expenditure and 
increasing the market values of non-land assets (Dang.T.H.Y, Nanseki.T., & Chomei.Y, 2018). 
Study by Sung.J.K and Yasuyuki.S (2003), identified how credit crunch negatively affect 
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household welfare, reduce consumption of luxury items, reducing food, education and health 
expenditures.  
 
Another study on “credit and capital [s]upport on economic behavior of farm households”, 
showed how economic activities of the household depends on credit (Bernardus.B.R, Bonar.M.S, 
Nunung.K, & Mohamad.H.S, 2013). In addition to this, difference-in-difference based study on 
credit impact of welfare identified that, more amount of credit has positive and significant impact 
on the household welfare than those earn less amount of credit. Least but not last, Siyoum, 
Dorothea and Alula, found disability of credit to take poor form poverty and ensure food security 
(Siyoum.A.D, Dorothea.H, & Alula.P, 2012). Thus, credit outcome of welfare is still 
controversial.  
 
2.4 Rural Informal Credit in Ethiopia  
 
As a developing country, Ethiopia is characterized by under developed financial sector. Beside 
this, “smoothing consumption in the face of shocks is challenging for subsistence populations 
given the low productivity characteristic of rain-fed agriculture” (Mark.C, Thomas.R, Mulye.G, 
2015). The financial sector of the country is not only weak in capacity, but also less accessibility, 
less developed in composition, inefficient, and is not modern (Negussie.E.G & Catherine.N, 
2017; Aderaw.G & Dr.Manjit.S, 2016). Especially, “formal financial institutions are inefficient 
and inaccessible in providing credit facilities to the poor” as citied by (Alemayehu.O & Fenet.B, 
2016)(identified by Assefa et al., 2005). They are also more concentrated in urban areas and 
sceptic to lend for resource disadvantaged country side farmer (Negussie.E.G & Catherine.N, 
2017; Gashayie.A & Singh.D, 2015). 
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To this matter, the rural Ethiopia is still much depend on informal financing for financial 
requirements. Informal sources are frequently used by households than formal sources (CSA, 
2017)3. The rural informal credit sector of the country is endowed by different participants. 
Relatives, friends, neighborhoods, religious institutions, groceries, local merchants, local shops, 
“Idir”4 and “Equib5” (Fichera.E, 2010) are the major actors. Also, the 2011 and 2015/16 socio-
economy survey identified these means of informal financing for rural Ethiopians. They together 
summed-up a total rural credit of 68.17% in 2011 and 66.1% in 2015 (CSA, 2013; CSA, 2017). 
 
Among informal credit sources, the last two are rotating saving and credit associations (RoSCAs) 
and are more known, participator (more individual and or households participate together), zero 
interest based and transparent. The remaining are characterized by less transparent and less 
participator and based on individual deep personal attachment and attached with some amount 
interest payments based on individual characteristic. In general, informal credit is more 
accessible and holds largest share in participation of rural households than formal credit services 
(Haileleul.G, 2001).  
 
In Ethiopia, rural informal credit is accessed in two forms. Either in cash form or in-kind form. 
Households with large number of family sizes with huge burden in providing food for family 
member go for cash form credit in off-harvesting period. Households with small cultivation land 
takes credit in kind form such as food crop. Also, an individual or households who have problem 
with health condition tend to have informal credit in form of cash (Teressa.A & Franz.H, 2000).  
 
                                                            
3 CSA denote Central Statistical Agency  
4 Idir is local association based on saving and credit motive organized by households who live in the same locality to 
escape from financial and psychological fall due to death of relatives.     
5 Equib is similar to rotating saving and credit association.  
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Either in cash or in-kind form, rural household’s decision to borrow is influenced by risk and 
uncertainty (Karlan.D, Kutsoati.E, McMillan.M, & Udry.C, 2011). But, in terms of credit supply 
choices, informal credit suppliers are popular and dominant (Negussie.E.G & Catherine.N, 2017). 
To access informal credit, factors such as family size, farm size, number of oxen and land 
ownership and other resource ownership were identified as a major determinant (Teressa.A & 
Franz.H, 2000; Daniel.A, 2003). Households with large number of dependent family size, 
because of high consumption, forced to participate in credit market actively have better access to 
informal credit. Individual and or household with fertile and large land size have also good 
access to credit because of collateral power of the land.  
 
Beside these, Temesgen.F.B, Bamlaku.A.A, Zerihun.G.K (2017), also identified “education level, 
participation in off-farm activities, membership in “equib,” distance from the market” as 
determining factors for access to credit for rural household. Those with better educational 
qualification and households with additional form of off-farm business engagement have better 
access to credit either for consumption smoothing or production.   
 
Even though, informal credit plays vital role in Ethiopian rural household, but from its 
informality nature as well as related to the economic stage of the country, have not well 
developed. There are factors that affects the development of informal financial market. The 
factors are government intervention, land property rights, population density, saving 
mobilization and institutional diversity. The factors determine development of the informal 
market by way of how government intervene in the market, with whether the land is owned by 
the government or private, with either population density is high or low and with prevalence of 
“reliable and safe” saving deposit. Beside these, institutional diversity which creates competition 
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among informal credit markets and lower the cost of borrowing to customers is also other source 
that determine the growth of informal financial institutions (Hussien.H.K, 2007).  
 
3. Data and Methodology  
 
3.1 Data  
The study was conducted based on secondary data collected by collaborative project between the 
CSA and the World Bank based on Living Standards Measurement Study Integrated Surveys of 
Agriculture project with aim of collecting “multi-topic panel household level data with focus on 
agricultural statistics and the link between agriculture and other household income activities” 
(CSA, 2017). The data is named Ethiopia Socioeconomic Survey of 2015/16. The survey is 
undertaken particularly by CSA of Ethiopia.  
 
Socioeconomic Survey data collection was beginning in Ethiopia in 2011 with focusing on rural 
area. The first socioeconomic data wave named “Ethiopia Rural Socioeconomic Survey” with 
focus on rural Ethiopia only. But, starting from the second wave, to give nationwide 
representative picture about the survey, the name “Rural” was dropped and renamed 
Socioeconomic Survey with inclusion of urban area. Thus, Socioeconomic Survey has been 
undertaken three times in Ethiopia.  
 
The first one was in 2011/12, which only focused on rural households, the second one was 
undertaken in 2013/14 and the third one was undertaken in 2015/16. Both the second and the 
third-round surveys collected data from both rural and urban part of the country. According to 
CSA, the first Socioeconomic Survey was conducted on 333 enumeration areas and the second 
and the third were conducted in 433 enumeration areas. In the first enumeration, out of total area 
290 were rural and 43 were small towns and the subsequent two are both from rural and urban. 
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Out of 433 enumeration areas 290 were rural, 43 were small town and 100 were from major 
urban centers of the country including Addis Ababa (CSA, 2017). 
 
The survey has been undertaken by using five questionnaires on household, community, 
agriculture, post-planting, post-harvest and livestock. The household questionnaires were used to 
collect data from all households; community-based questionnaires were used to have information 
about “infrastructure; community organizations; resource management; changes in the 
community; key events; community needs, actions and achievements; and local retail price 
information”. The remaining three questionnaires were agriculture activities related and used for 
collecting data from those households whose livelihood entirely or in some form attached with 
agricultural activities (CSA, 2017). 
 
For this study we used 2015/16 Socioeconomic Survey which is obtained from World Bank 
Microdata Library. The survey includes data set of household consumption aggregate, land, food 
and crop, Geo-variables (geo-spatial), livestock, post-plant and post-harvest information and data 
set of community from which the households are drawn. In connection to this, for households in 
nine community s, credit and welfare related socio-economic data was extracted from different 
data sets of the survey.  
 
In the study, household total consumption expenditure was used as proxy to indicate the welfare 
of the household. For informal credit data, the amount of credit obtained by households from 
relatives, friends, neighborhoods, religious institutions, groceries, local merchants, local shops, 
“Idir” and “Equib” are used. A total of 2,396 households’ data was used to see the econometric 
relationship. To avoid the selection bias, we used both households who get credit and those 
households who didn’t get credit.  
15 
 
3.2 Methodology  
To investigating the relationship between informal credit and household welfare, this study 
tested a welfare equation in which the dependent variable is household welfare which is 
measured by proxying household annual consumption expenditure and the independent variable 
of total household informal credit, which is obtained by summation of all informal sources of 
relatives, friends, neighborhoods, religious institutions, groceries, local merchants, local shops, 
“Idir” and “Equib” (Quach.M.H, Mullineux.A.W, Murinde.V, 2007). 
 
Following the previous works of (Fichera.E, 2010; Akudugu.M.A, 2014; Cuong.V.N & 
Marrit.vanden.B, 2014), the regression model will control for other factors supposed to influence 
household economic welfare. At the household level, welfare might be affected by household 
socio-economic characteristics, including gender and educational level of household head, total 
area of household landholding, household size, farm area, access to extension services, purpose 
of credit, owing of non-agricultural activities, and whether the household is affected by shock or 
not. At the community levels, household welfare is possibly influenced by the community-based 
characteristics in which the household dwell. These may include such as road and market access.   
 
The study employed 2SLS method. It follows the works of (Cuong.V.N & Marrit.vanden.B, 
2011) and (Akudugu.M.A, 2014) who followed similar approach to estimate the impact of 
Informal credit on poverty and inequality in Vietnam and the effect of formal and informal credit 
on farm household welfare in Ghana respectively. Initial informal credit will be estimated based 
on household and community related characteristics and Instrumental Variable that can have 
potential impact on getting credit but not on welfare and then welfare will be estimated by 
including the estimated credit and other variables.   
 
16 
 
Model: 
ln(𝒀𝒊𝒄𝒓)  =   α 𝑪ଙ𝒄𝒓෢ +  β𝑿𝒊𝒄𝒓 + 𝝆𝒄𝒚 + 𝝁𝒓𝒚 + 𝜺𝒊𝒄𝒓𝒀  
 
𝑪௜௖௥   =   𝜆𝑍 + Ω𝑿௜௖௥ + 𝜌௖௞ + 𝜇௥௞ + 𝜀௜௖௥௞  
Where,   
ln(𝐘୧ୡ୰)  represents logarithmic of household consumption expenditure measured in Ethiopian 
Birr (ETB) for household i from community c and region r.  𝐂୧ୡ୰ the total amount of informal 
credit obtained by household i in community c and region r from different informal credit 
providing agents. 𝐗୧ୡ୰   is a set of observed socio-economic characteristics of household i in 
community c and region r.   
 
The control variables must be not affecting the amount of informal credit household get 
(Ravallion.M, 2001; Heckman.J.J, Robert.J.L, Jeffrey.A.S, 1999). Z is instrumental variable/s 
that can determine the amount of credit household i in community r can obtain but not welfare. α, 
β, Ω, ρ and λ are unknown variables to be estimated from both equations. 𝜌௖௞ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜇௥௞represents 
unobservable factor/s of community and region fixed effect that affects the amount informal 
credit received by household. 𝝆𝒄𝒚  and 𝝁𝒓𝒚  represents unobservable factor/s of community and 
region fixed effect that affects the amount consumption expenditure made by household. ε୧ୡ୰୷  is 
contained errors, representing other determinants of household welfare that vary across 
households, such that E(ε୧ୡ୰୷  /𝑪𝒊𝒄𝒓 , 𝐗୧ୡ୰)=0 assuming that all factors are observable, the effect of 
informal credit on household welfare which measured by α is estimated without bias. ε୧ୡ୰୩  is 
contained errors, representing other determinants of amount of informal credit obtained, that vary 
across households in community c and region r, such that E(ε୧ୡ୰ୡ  / 𝐗୧ୡ୰, Z, 𝜌௖௞, μ௥௞,)=0. 
 
If all independents variables are observable, the effects of informal credit on household welfare 
can been “α” and estimated without any bias (Akudugu.M.A, 2014). However, there is a 
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problem of endogeneity in the model. And, because of the endogeneity which is created due to 
unobservable household and or community level factors that affect amount informal credit 
obtained, the estimation will be biased if we don’t take care of that. Thus, the problem of 
endogeneity should be solved. The problem of endogeneity can be solved by different means. 
But the ad hoc approaches and instrumental variables estimation technique are widely used. Ad 
hoc approaches follow, if the dependent variable is endogenous, replacing it with a proxy 
variable will make it free from endogeneity problem. The most common approach to deal with 
endogeneity problem is instrumental variables estimation technique (Wooldrige.J.M, 2006; 
Shepherd.B, Doytchinova.H.S, Kravchenko.A, 2019).  
 
Thus, in this study we followed instrumental variables estimation technique to solve the problem 
of endogeneity. But, the problem with this approach is finding appropriate instrument for 
variable that create the problem of endogeneity. In our case, the problem was created by informal 
credit; and in this regard, applying the theory of demand is a good solution. Following the theory, 
demand is determined by price and thus, the price of a good or service is a good instrument for 
approximating the demand. In relation to this, the price of informal credit, which is the interest 
rate the loan provider going to charge, will be a good instrument. However, the difficulty of 
using interest rate as an instrument is, the amount of interest rate to be charged by the lender 
didn’t vary among households. The credit provider charges the same amount of interest for every 
households. Therefore, it will not be a good instrument. Alternately, the study employed other 
instruments following review of previous studies output and literatures. 
 
The study employed an instrument that are potentially will determine the amount of informal 
credit but not welfare of a household. The instrument is, average number of informal borrowing 
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participant households within community. This is from the fact that, given the low amount of 
available liquid fund in rural developing economies, the higher the proportion of informal 
borrowing participant households in the community, the lower will be the share of credit can 
each household obtain. The lower the number of informal borrowing participant households in 
the community, the higher will be the amount of cash available for each household who are 
participating in the credit market. Cuong.V.N and Marrit.vanden.B (2011), used similar 
instrumental variable while undertaking “Informal credit, usury, or support?” study in Vietnam. 
Based on the size of the ratio, the amount of fund size for credit vary and amount of credit 
received by household will increase or decrease. 
 
The instrumental variable which is appropriate and identified well mean, the relationship 
between the dependent and independent variable will be estimated without bias (Wooldridge.J.M, 
2002). Thus, to estimate informal credit amount obtained successfully, average number of 
informal borrowing participant households in community were employed as an instrumental 
variable. These instrumental variables also should fulfil three requirements to be good instrument 
1) the instruments should uncorrelated with outcome variable 2) the instruments have correlation 
with endogenous variable and 3) the instruments should be randomly assigned.  
 
Thus, the estimated credit model was: 
𝑪௜௖௥   =   𝜆𝑍 + Ω𝑿௜௖௥ + 𝜌௖௞ + 𝜇௥௞ + 𝜀௜௖௥௞  
 
where:  
𝐂୧ୡ୰ is the amount of informal credit received by household i in community c and region r from 
different informal credit providing agents. The Z variable is replaced by instrumental variable 
which is household levels average household characteristics that can influence the amount of 
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informal credit households will borrow. 𝑿௜௖௥  is a set of observed socio-economic household 
specific variables. Ω and λ are unknown parameters to be estimated from both equations.  𝜌௖௞ 
and  𝜇௥௞ are community and region fixed effects. 
 
ln(𝒀𝒊𝒄𝒓)  =   α 𝑪ଙ𝒄𝒓෢ +  β𝑿𝒊𝒄𝒓 + 𝝆𝒄𝒚 + 𝝁𝒓𝒚 + 𝜺𝒊𝒄𝒓𝒀  
 
where:  
ln(𝐘୧ୡ୰)  represents logarithmic of household consumption expenditure measured in Ethiopian 
Birr (1000 ETB) by household i in community c and region r as a proxy for welfare. 𝐶ప௖௥෢  
represents the estimated amount of credit can be obtained from informal credit market. 𝑿௜௖௥ is a 
set of observed socio-economic household level characteristics for household i from community 
c and region r. α and β are unknown parameters to be estimated from equations. 𝝆𝒄𝒚 and  𝝁𝒓𝒚 are 
community and regional level fixed variables that affect household welfare. 
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4. Descriptive Statistics, Result Presentation and Discussion  
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics    
 
The total household who fulfill all required data for the study were 2,396 and this number of 
households are used to undertake the study. The major variables of the study are logarithmic of 
household Welfare, Informal Credit Amount, Farm Income, Non-Farm Income, Household Size, 
Extension Participation and Assistance Received. The mean of the household consumption 
expenditure is Birr 9,911, the richest rural household has annual consumption expenditure per 
household is approximately Birr 12,148 and the poorest make expenditure of Birr 7,157. When 
we see the informal credit amount received among households, there are two unique groups. The 
first groups contain household with no credit or zero credit benefit and the second group contain 
those households who have got some amount of credit. From the total 2,396 households about 
77.9 percentage of the household haven’t get any amount of credit. The remaining 22.1 
percentage of the households got credit. Among the households who get credit, the maximum 
was about Birr 70,000 and the minimum was Birr 100.   
Table 1: definition of variable and measuring units 
Variables Measurement   
Logarithmic of welfare  Amount of Consumption Expenditure In thousand Ethiopia Birr 
Independent Variables 
Informal Credit Amount In thousand Ethiopia Birr 
Farm Income In thousand Ethiopia Birr 
Non-Farm Income In thousand Ethiopia Birr  
Household Size Number of people in Household 
Extension Participation 
Dummy Variable (household participated in extension program=1; 
Otherwise=0) 
Assistance Received  In thousand Ethiopia Birr   
Farm Area belongs to Household Size of Farm Area Owned by Household in M.Sq 
Credit Repaid or not Dummy Variable (if the household repay Credit =1; Otherwise=0) 
Source of Credit Dummy Variable (Credit received from Relatives=1; Otherwise=0) 
Owning Nonagricultural Activity 
Dummy Variable (if household own Nonagricultural Activity =1; 
Otherwise=0) 
Sex of Household Head Dummy Variable (if household head is Male =1; Otherwise=0) 
Reading and Writing of Household  Dummy Variable (if household head Read & Write=1; Otherwise=0) 
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Variables Measurement   
Shocked Affected  
Dummy Variable (If Household is Affected by any Shock=1; 
Otherwise=0) 
Instrumental Variable 
Average number of Informal Borrowing participant 
Households within community  
Number of Informal borrowing participant households in community 
divided by Number of Households in community  
Invers Mill Ratio to control for selection bias of dependent variable 
Invers Mill Ratio Dummy Variable (If Logarithmic of welfare is report=1; Otherwise=0) 
 
In relation to five other analysis variables, i.e. farm income, non-farm income, household size, 
household extension participation and assistance received, the statistical report is as follows. 
Among households about 30.63 percent of households participated in selling their products and 
have farm income. The remaining household doesn’t get income from selling agricultural output. 
All sampled households on average gets Birr 1,483 income from other non-farming activities. 
The maximum nonfarm income was Birr 58,534.   
Table 2: Descriptive statistical report of the variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variable 
logarithmic of Welfare   2,396 9.911 0.712 7.157 12.148
logarithmic of Welfare reported (1 & 0, for probit 
regression to generate IMR) 2,396 0.994 0.076 0 1 
Main Independent Variables 
Informal Credit Amount 2,396 2.161 10.628 0 70 
Instrumental Variables  
Number of Informal Borrowing participant Households 
within community  2,396 0.038 0.043 0 0.475 
Control Variables 
Farm Income 2,396 0.902 3.294 0 38 
Non-Farm Income 2,396 1.483 4.701 0 58.534
Assistance Received  2,396 0.230 0.670 0 12 
Household Size 2,396 5.215 2.318 1 17 
Extension Participation 2,396 0.264 0.441 0 1 
Owning Nonagricultural Activity 2,396 0.113 0.316 0 1 
Farm Area belongs to Household 2,396 1.964 6.874 0 47.673
Credit Repaid or not 2,396 0.807 0.395 0 1 
Source of Credit 2,396 0.098 0.297 0 1 
Sex 2,396 0.611 0.488 0 1 
Reading and Writing of HH head  2,396 0.389 0.488 0 1 
Whether the Household is Affected by Shocked 2,396 0.043 0.203 0 1 
Invers Mill Ratio 2,396 0.017 0.168 -2.866 0.676 
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Looking at household size, the study data contain a household size of minimum 1 and maximum 
17.  Around 78.58 percentage of the household has a size of 2 to 7 person per household. The 
mean household size is five person per household. From extension participation perspective on 
average 26.4 percentage of the household were participating in extension service and 28.4 
percentage households gets some amount of assistance from third party someone who is not 
current member household.  
 
4.2 Result Presentation  
 
Table -3- Reduced form and Probit model 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES logwelfare ProbitWel 
AInBHHsinCom6       -0.008  
 (0.809)  
Farm Income     0.024**    0.076** 
 (0.010) (0.034) 
Non-Farm Income     0.017***  
 (0.004)  
Assistance Received -0.036 0.249 
 (0.026) (0.244) 
Household Size    0.153*** -0.006 
 (0.011) (0.048) 
Extension Participation     0.370***   0.861* 
 (0.067) (0.444) 
Owning Nonagricultural Activity -0.067 -0.191 
 (0.069) (0.520) 
Farm Area    0.012*** 0.011 
 (0.005) (0.027) 
Credit Repaid or not -0.216*       1.095*** 
  (0.113) (0.326) 
Source of Credit        -0.272 -0.511 
 (0.201) (0.373) 
Sex       -0.000 -0.020 
  (0.043) (0.243) 
Reading and Writing of HH head      0.246*** 0.349 
  (0.055) (0.256) 
Shocked affected    -0.036  
  (0.046)  
                                                            
6 AInBHHsinCom:- Indicates Average Number of Informal Borrowing participant Households within 
community.   
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IMR2      4.300***  
   (0.239)  
Community 2 -0.156 -0.405 
    (0.114)  (0.262) 
Community 3 0.022 0.625 
 (0.085)   (0.489) 
Community 4      0.239***  
 (0.059)  
Community 5      0.595***  
 (0.086)  
Community 6     -0.721 -0.425 
 (0.668)   (0.501) 
Community 7 0.116  
 (0.073)  
Community 8 -0.028  
 (0.170)  
Community 9 0.587  
 (0.591)  
Community 10 0.086  
 (0.101)  
InFCredit  0.027* 
  (0.015) 
Constant      8.904***    1.332*** 
 (0.119) (0.391) 
   
Observations 2,396 1,061 
R-squared 0.337  
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. logwelfare in the first column is the dependent variable, 
which is annual household consumption as a proxy for welfare outcome measurement of rural household. Its measuring unit is in 
logarithmic form. 
 
Table -4- IV Regression first stage Results 
VARIABLES Informal Credit
  
AInBHHsinCom    -0282*** 
 (0.071) 
Farm Income        21.347***
 (5.909)  
Non-Farm Income         -0.013 
   (0.0198) 
Assistance Received             0.376** 
          (0.137) 
Household Size         -0.278*** 
 (0.060) 
Extension Participation -0.200 
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VARIABLES Informal Credit
 (0.216) 
Owning Nonagricultural Activity 0.523 
 (0.332) 
Farm Area      1.174*** 
  (0.045)  
Credit Repaid or not      -3.477*** 
 (0.433) 
Source of Credit       3.865*** 
 (1.043) 
Sex -0.028 
 (0.170) 
Reading and Writing of HH head      0.490** 
 (0.246) 
Shocked affected  -0.512 
 (0.935) 
Invers Mill Ratio -1.039 
(0.935) 
Community 2       1.688*** 
 (0.452) 
Community 3     0.643** 
 (0.252) 
Community 4     1.139** 
 (2.18) 
Community 5        2.912*** 
   (0.316) 
Community 6 -0.030 
   (0.772) 
Community 7        2.477*** 
    (0.416) 
Community 8     1.180* 
     (0.537) 
Community 9   -2.260 
      (1.666) 
Community 10         -14.289***
      (0.563)  
Constant         1.767** 
       (0.546) 
Observations     2,396 
  
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. the dependent variable here is informal credit and the 
main independent variable is average number of informal borrowing participant households within community.   
 
Table 5- OLS, Multiple OLS, IV without Hechman, IV with Heckman and IV with Heckman robust 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
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VARIABLES Simple OLS Multiple OLS IV with credit related additional 
controls 
IV with Heckman 
sample selection 
control 
IV with Heckman sample 
selection control and 
community and region 
fixed effect 
      
Informal Credit 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.028 0.031* 0.043** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.031) (0.018) (0.021) 
Farm Income  -0.008** 0.008 0.037***   0.067*** 
  (0.003) (0.014) (0.008) (0.013) 
Non-Farm Income  0.018*** 0.019*** -0.000 0.002 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
Assistance Received  -0.086*** -0.092*** -0.082*** 0.002 
  (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025) 
Household Size  0.198*** 0.198*** 0.170***   0.128*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.012) 
Extension Participation  0.309*** 0.243*** 0.502***    0.648*** 
  (0.043) (0.045) (0.037) (0.069) 
Owning Nonagricultural Activity   0.008 -0.444***   -0.607*** 
   (0.075) (0.060) (0.091) 
Farm Area   -0.022 -0.009 -0.023 
   (0.036) (0.022) (0.023) 
Credit Repaid or not   -0.126 0.382*** 0.413*** 
   (0.156) (0.085) (0.143) 
Source of Credit   -0.544** -0.878*** -0.742*** 
   (0.262) (0.104) (0.163) 
Sex   0.011 -0.198*** -0.152*** 
  (0.041) (0.031) (0.034)
Reading and Writing of HH head   0.133** 0.146*** 0.261*** 
   (0.053) (0.034) (0.039) 
Shocked affected      -0.045 -0.137** -0.106** 
   (0.049) (0.070) (0.049) 
IMR2    3.355*** 3.603*** 
    (0.106) (0.393) 
Community2      -0.302*** 
     (0.090) 
Community3     -0.198** 
     (0.083) 
Community4     0.149*** 
     (0.049) 
Community5     0.566*** 
     (0.066) 
Community6     -0.599* 
     (0.346) 
Community7     -0.239** 
     (0.105) 
Community8     -0.136 
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     (0.172) 
Community9     -0.191 
     (0.733) 
Community10     0.462* 
     (0.261) 
Region2     0.475*** 
     (0.067) 
Region3     0.034 
     (0.077) 
Region4     -0.074 
     (0.073) 
Region5     0.319*** 
     (0.078) 
Region6     0.346*** 
     (0.095) 
Region7     -0.351*** 
     (0.118) 
Region8     0.573*** 
     (0.081) 
Region9     -0.430*** 
     (0.092) 
Region10     0.224** 
     (0.114) 
Constant 9.896*** 8.778*** 8.882*** 8.482*** 8.317*** 
 (0.022) (0.050) (0.145) (0.083) (0.130) 
      
Observations 2,396 2,396 2,396 2,396 2,396 
R-squared 0.005 0.241 0.260 0.567 0.662 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable, which is annual household 
consumption as a proxy for welfare outcome measurement of rural household. Its measuring unit is in logarithmic form. 
 
4.3 Discussion 
 
The regression results in table 3 and 4 show the statistical relationship between variables of 
dependent, independents and instruments. Table 3 presents the reduced form and probit model 
regression results. As placed in the table, the relationship between the instrumental variables and 
the outcome variable has statistically no significant relation. This proves the condition of 
instrument exclusion assumption of the instrumental variable estimation approach. The probit 
model result is for controlling selection bias. This is done by estimating Invers Mill Ration from 
probit model and controlling for it in many regressions. If the parameter of estimate for Invers 
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Mill Ration is significant, controlling for it, leads to better estimation. In table 4 we have first 
stage result of the main regression. Which shows how causal effect of instrumental variable and 
informal credit look. As shown in the result, the variable is statistically significant in determining 
informal credit. Also, the F statistics and instrument endogeneity assumption is fulfilled. Plus, 
the R-square result of the subsequent regression outcome was increasing; which confirms that, 
the additional of variables from column 1 to column 5 was not merely for considering different 
variables rather each addition of the variable have effect on outcome variable.    
    
In table five we have simple OLS, multiple OLS, IV with additional credit related controls, IV 
with Heckman sample selection control and IV with Heckman sample selection control and community 
fixed effect. The presentation of the first four column of table five is just to show, how the 
relationship looks like with usual and Iv estimation technique and based on to make comparison. 
The result in column five estimate based on instrumental variable with selection control and 
fixed effect is to make discussion because of its appropriateness and methodological correctness 
of the result. In OLS estimation the result assumes credit amount was determined without bias 
and thus it is not endogenous. But, in instrumental variable case, endogeneity of credit was 
considered.  
                 
The opposite relationship between average informal borrowing participant households with 
amount of informal credit obtained in table four, indicate that households from highly 
competitive community have lower credit share and those from low competitive community s 
have better credit share. The result is similar to what was found by (Logan.C & Alec.T, 2017) 
while studying a socio-cultural analysis of smallholder borrowing and debt in southern Ethiopia. 
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According to their finding, among factors that lower the amount of loan provided to household 
was participation of more households for borrowing.  
 
The above results for instrumental variables correctness was evaluated by testing for endogeneity, 
and instrument relevance. The endogeneity test was undertaken by Durbin test and the null 
hypothesis was variables are exogenous and we found that p-value for Durbin test is significant 
and the informal credit variable was endogenous. The instrument relevance test was undertaken 
by F statistics test; which show strengthens of the result, is valid (see the appendix for further). 
 
In table five, we see that the informal credit and household welfare has positive relationship. 
Even though the result was different from the one found by (R.S.Manyaja, F.D.K.Anim, & 
E.T.Gwata, 2018; Akudugu.M.A, 2014), while studying similar case in South Africa and Ghana. 
But there are studies by (Kati.S, 2010; Cuong.V.N & Marrit.vanden.B, 2011) that generated 
similar results. Informal credit improves welfare expenditure of households. Ceteris paribus 
other determining factors, every thousand ETB obtained from informal lending market leads to 
4.3 percentage increase in welfare of household.  
 
Farm income effect on household welfare is also positive and statistically significant at 1 percent. 
Every thousand Birr increase in farm income, increases consumption expenditure of household 
by 5.4 percentage. The result was similar with (Cuong.V.N & Marrit.vanden.B, 2011; 
Shahidur.R.K & Rashid.R.F, 2003; Shahidur.R.K, 2005).  
 
Considering the household size effect on household consumption expenditure, the regression 
result was as per expectation. The household size positively affects household consumption 
expenditure. Increase of household size by 1 unit increases the household consumption 
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expenditure by amount of 12.8 percentage point. The result was mostly expected; because of 
higher household size requires higher amount of consumption expenditure.  And also, lower 
productivity of agriculture in rural developing countries forces the household to have additional 
food as well as non-food expenditure for every addition of new household member. Studies 
undertaken by (Angus.D & Christina.P, 1998; Ke, David , Kei, Riadh, Jan, & Christopher, 2003 ) 
also founded similar results. Thus, the higher the size of the family, the higher household 
consumption expenditure is.  
 
Following the regression result, household’s extension program participation has significant 
effect on outcome variable. Household with extension program participation have made 64.8 
percentage more consumption expenditure than household who couldn’t participate. This is may 
be due to monetary transfer from government because of extension program participation and 
improved farming technique support the extension participant households receive from the 
government. This result is similar to what (Kidanemariam , Erik , Jozef , Kindeya , Hans , & 
Miet , 2013) were found while studying the Economic Impact of a New Rural Extension 
Approach in Northern Ethiopia.  
 
The case of non-farming income and assistance received impact on consumption expenditure of 
rural household is unusually result, but some of previous research works also confirms similar 
outcomes (Akudugu.M.A, 2014; Fred & Daniel , 2014). The regression result shows 
insignificant impact of the variables on welfare outcome of rural households. This is may be 
attributed to rural households spend non-farming and assistance related incomes in non-welfare 
improving land lease payments and other social participation contributions. 
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5. Checking Robustness of the result 
The above result is robust for different expenditure groups and for per-adult equivalence 
consumption expenditure. Estimation results for Adult consumption equivalence, food and non-
food consumption expenditure and educational expenditure. Informal credit has positive and 
statistically significant effect in all form of expenditures.  
 
Table 6 Robustness check 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Per-adult equivalent consumption expenditure Food consumption expenditure 
Non-food consumption 
expenditure   Educational expenditure 
Household Consumption 
Expenditure7 
Informal Credit     0.049**              -0.007     0.050**  0.075*    0.066** 
 (0.021) (0.026) (0.022) (0.039) (0.029) 
Farm income      0.050***       0.075***      0.064***      0.171***      0.076*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.024) (0.014) 
Non-Farm Income             0.003       0.014***           -0.002       0.038*** 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
Assistance Received            -0.002    -0.066** -0.011 0.059 -0.000 
 (0.023) (0.033) (0.028) (0.046) (0.025) 
Household Size      -0.075***       0.187***       0.129***      0.535***      0.135*** 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.020) (0.016) 
Extension Participation       0.423***       0.663***      0.608***       0.817***      0.637*** 
 (0.059) (0.068) (0.070) (0.090) (0.074) 
IMR21       3.133***     
 (0.305)     
IMR23       3.405***    
  (0.206)    
IMR22         3.537***   
   (0.387)   
IMR24         2.758***  
    (0.045)  
IMR2          3.683*** 
     (0.381) 
Constant       8.425***       6.326***       8.167***     -0.829***      8.267*** 
 (0.111) (0.114) (0.131) (0.136) (0.130) 
      
Observations 2,396 2,396 2,396 2,396 2,396 
R-squared 0.550 0.727 0.633 0.871 0.647 
 
                                                            
7 Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 and the top raw variables are the dependent 
variables and they are in logarithmic form. The estimation in column five was based on using whether community 
leaders organized meeting for community members during last 2 years, as instrumental Variable.  
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Statistical as well as economical higher impact is observed in Per-adult equivalent consumption 
expenditure and non-food consumption expenditure than food and educational expenditure. All 
consumption expenditures are significance at level significant of 5 percentage. Higher effect on 
non-food expenditure verifies that rural households have better food access than non-food so that 
they look more cash for material related consumption. In relation to adult equivalent 
consumption expenditure, higher relationship with credit shows adult participation in credit 
market and spend what they received in welfare improving consumption expenditure.  
 
The result in column 5 was generated by taking whether community leaders organized meeting 
for community members during last 2 years, as instrumental Variable.  
 
 Source: designed by author following the theoretical explanation of Michel 2003, Dean , et al. 2008 and Chai, S., et 
al. 2018. 
 
The task was undertaken by following the works of (Michel , 2003; Chai, S., Y. Chen, , B. 
Huang , & D. Ye, 2018; Dean , Markus , Tanya, & Adam, 2008) where they found that Social 
Gathering affects social network and that further affects social capital and following social 
capital affects trust level on which most of rural informal credit depends. Thus, by using 
different IV also the welfare outcome of rural informal credit is positive and significant.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Social 
Gathering 
Social 
Network
Social 
Capital Trust
Informal 
Credit 
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6. Conclusion and Recommendation  
 
6.1 Conclusion   
 
This study work is based on the idea of consumption smoothing theory which was demonstrated 
based on “life-cycle model of consumption”. The model describes about the whole life time 
movement of individual is based on consumption and saving choices. This study focuses on 
credit related informal risk sharing mechanism, in which rural households obtain credit in 
informal form from relatives, neighborhood, religious institutions, friends, shops, groceries, etc,. 
for risk sharing mechanism. The focus of the study was, the amount of credit obtained and its 
impact on household welfare.   
Following 2SLS regression analysis by taking average number of informal borrowing participant 
households within community as an instrumental variables for informal credit in order to avoid 
potential endogeneity, the study found that informal credit and households welfare have positive 
and significant relation and this result was similar with pervious works of (Kati.S, 2010; 
Cuong.V.N & Marrit.vanden.B, 2011).  
 
Also, the robustness of the regression result was checked for different consumption expenditure 
categories, per-adult equivalence consumption expenditure and using whether community 
leaders organized meeting for community members during last 2 years, as another instrumental 
Variable.  
 
6.2 Recommendation  
 
Informal credit significantly influences rural household welfare and thus, considering it as a policy 
variable factor while in designing rural financial policy is necessary. In this regard, though, regulatory 
policies of government have no direct effect on informal credit, but to improve the household level 
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welfare outcome, facilitating social interactions and brotherhoods among rural households and giving 
policy support for more organized informal credit institutions such as “Idir” and “Equib” will improve the 
welfare effect of informal household.  
 
The positive impact of farm income and household’s extension program participation on household 
welfare means, households get cash from selling their farm products and extension program participation, 
which helped them to improve their welfare. In this regard, policies that improves market access and 
expands extension program activities for rural households will be additional input for further 
improvement of household welfare. Additionally, this study was undertaken with single period cross-
sectional data with non-perfect instrumental variables. In this regard, undertaking further studies with 
panel data and prefect instrumental variable/s is recommended for better result.   
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Table 6 Robustness check 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Per-adult equivalent 
consumption 
expenditure 
Food consumption 
expenditure 
Non-food 
consumption 
expenditure   
Educational 
expenditure 
Household 
Consumption 
Expenditure 
      
Informal Credit 0.049** -0.007 0.050** 0.075* 0.066** 
 (0.021) (0.026) (0.022) (0.039) (0.029) 
Farm income 0.050*** 0.075*** 0.064*** 0.171*** 0.076*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.024) (0.014) 
Non-Farm Income 0.003 0.014*** -0.002 0.038*** 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
Assistance Received -0.002 -0.066** -0.011 0.059 -0.000 
 (0.023) (0.033) (0.028) (0.046) (0.025) 
Household Size -0.075*** 0.187*** 0.129*** 0.535*** 0.135*** 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.020) (0.016) 
Extension Participation 0.423*** 0.663*** 0.608*** 0.817*** 0.637*** 
 (0.059) (0.068) (0.070) (0.090) (0.074) 
OwnNonAgri -0.744*** 0.320*** -0.682*** 0.102 -0.635*** 
 (0.082) (0.057) (0.091) (0.086) (0.083) 
Farmarea -0.038 0.036 -0.033 -0.013 -0.049 
 (0.024) (0.030) (0.025) (0.045) (0.033) 
CrRepayornot 0.350*** -0.043 0.398*** 1.110*** 0.514*** 
 (0.128) (0.115) (0.144) (0.171) (0.142) 
SourceofCredit -0.708*** -0.183 -0.766*** -0.184 -0.829*** 
  Robust regression F(1,2370)     =  16.9638  (p = 0.0000)
  Robust score chi2(1)            =  26.5271  (p = 0.0000)
  Wu-Hausman F(1,2370)            =  44.1733  (p = 0.0000)
  Durbin (score) chi2(1)          =  43.8408  (p = 0.0000)
  Ho: variables are exogenous
  Tests of endogeneity
                                                                            
     InFCredit    0.8394      0.8377       0.0215       12.0732    0.0005
                                                                            
      Variable     R-sq.       R-sq.        R-sq.     F(1,2371)   Prob > F
                            Adjusted      Partial       Robust
                                                                            
  First-stage regression summary statistics
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 (0.141) (0.134) (0.164) (0.175) (0.162) 
Sex -0.157*** -0.065* -0.135*** 0.095** -0.162*** 
 (0.030) (0.035) (0.034) (0.048) (0.035) 
ReadandWriting 0.118*** 0.408*** 0.242*** 0.836*** 0.241*** 
 (0.035) (0.043) (0.040) (0.064) (0.049) 
Shockaffected -0.077* -0.192** -0.099** 0.040 -0.095* 
 (0.047) (0.085) (0.049) (0.091) (0.051) 
Community 2 -0.234*** -0.285*** -0.293*** 0.224 -0.358*** 
 (0.081) (0.095) (0.091) (0.139) (0.099) 
Community 3 -0.143** -0.298*** -0.144* 0.022 -0.226** 
 (0.072) (0.087) (0.086) (0.119) (0.090) 
Community 4 0.189*** 0.117* 0.181*** 0.599*** 0.131** 
 (0.045) (0.062) (0.050) (0.074) (0.055) 
Community 5 0.532*** 0.747*** 0.558*** 0.721*** 0.550*** 
 (0.061) (0.084) (0.069) (0.102) (0.068) 
Community 6 -0.491 -0.102 -0.668** 1.312*** -0.617* 
 (0.323) (0.237) (0.335) (0.222) (0.338) 
Community 7 -0.257*** -1.151*** -0.100 1.626*** -0.305*** 
 (0.097) (0.111) (0.107) (0.165) (0.112) 
Community 8 0.027 -0.685 -0.117 0.364 -0.170 
 (0.171) (0.545) (0.193) (0.367) (0.179) 
Community 9 -0.266 -2.138** 0.026 -1.408*** -0.147 
 (0.740) (0.956) (0.713) (0.325) (0.723) 
Community10 1.029*** 0.384 0.599** 0.304 0.759** 
 (0.276) (0.339) (0.280) (0.512) (0.379) 
Region 2 0.204*** 0.560*** 0.450*** 0.270** 0.429*** 
 (0.064) (0.081) (0.070) (0.122) (0.075) 
Region 3 -0.103 -0.313*** 0.038 -0.556*** 0.060 
 (0.070) (0.081) (0.080) (0.105) (0.085) 
Region 4 -0.235*** -0.039 -0.111 -0.392*** -0.113 
 (0.068) (0.093) (0.076) (0.123) (0.080) 
Region 5 0.180** 0.172* 0.317*** -0.298** 0.300*** 
 (0.072) (0.092) (0.081) (0.117) (0.079) 
Region 6 0.127 -0.644*** 0.442*** -1.193*** 0.260** 
 (0.095) (0.127) (0.100) (0.184) (0.128) 
Region 7 -0.466*** -0.141 -0.439*** -0.181 -0.380*** 
 (0.105) (0.129) (0.120) (0.137) (0.109) 
Region 8 0.408*** 0.686*** 0.555*** -2.062*** 0.539*** 
 (0.081) (0.111) (0.086) (0.162) (0.088) 
Region 9 -0.213*** -1.617*** -0.346*** -0.889*** -0.452*** 
 (0.074) (0.117) (0.093) (0.145) (0.092) 
Region 10 -0.074 0.375** 0.174 0.169 0.115 
 (0.110) (0.149) (0.119) (0.216) (0.164) 
IMR21 3.133***     
 (0.305)     
IMR23  3.405***    
  (0.206)    
IMR22   3.537***   
   (0.387)   
IMR24    2.758***  
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    (0.045)  
IMR2     3.683*** 
     (0.381) 
Constant 8.425*** 6.326*** 8.167*** -0.829*** 8.267*** 
 (0.111) (0.114) (0.131) (0.136) (0.130) 
      
Observations 2,396 2,396 2,396 2,396 2,396 
R-squared 0.550 0.727 0.633 0.871 0.647 
 
 
 
